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PREVIEW; United States v. Campbell: Rocky Mountain High – The
Ninth Circuit’s Chance to Concentrate on the Definition of Marijuana
Lauren Moose*
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is
scheduled to consider the matter of United States v. Adam Walter
Campbell on Aug. 31, 2020 at 9:00 a.m., in the William K. Nakamura
Courthouse, Seattle, Washington. Larry Jent will likely appear on behalf
of the Appellant Adam Campbell. Joseph Thaggard will likely appear on
behalf of the Appellee the United States.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The primary issue in this case is whether Appellant Adam
Campbell’s manufacture of cannabis concentrates in 2016 complied with
the Montana Medical Marijuana Act (“MMA”)1 effectively enjoining the
Department of Justice (“DOJ”) from prosecuting Campbell for violations
of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(1)2 and 18 U.S.C. § 2.3 The Ninth Circuit’s decision
will clarify the reach of the MMA, specifically if cannabis extracts and
concentrates are considered marijuana as defined by the Montana Code
Annotated § 50-32-101(18). This decision has the potential to render
certain medicinal preparations illegal if the Ninth Circuit upholds the
District Court’s exclusion of cannabis extracts and concentrates from the
MMA’s definition of marijuana.4
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In May of 2016, the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”)
and the Missouri River Drug Task Force (“MRDTF”) investigated
Montana Bud, a medical marijuana production and distribution business
in Bozeman, Montana.5 Montana Bud was licensed to sell “marijuanainfused products.”6 A raid uncovering significant amounts of marijuana
plants, hashish oil, and a butane hash oil laboratory led to the indictment
of Adam Campbell, an employee of Montana Bud and owner of the
*

J.D. Candidate, Alexander Blewett III School of Law at the University of Montana Class of 2022.
See generally MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-301 to 344 (2015). Campbell was prosecuted in
accordance to the 2015 version of this act, the current version does offer further clarification on
manufacturing concentrates under the MMA.
2
21 U.S.C.A. § 856(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158) (it is unlawful to maintain a space
that manufactures controlled substances except as narrowly exempted within state marijuana laws).
3
18 U.S.C.A. § 2 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158).
4
United States v. Campbell, No. CR 18-5-BU-DLC, 2018 WL 6728062, at *6 (D. Mont. Dec. 21,
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-30115 (Jun. 6, 2019).
5
Appellant’s Opening Brief at *5, United States v. Campbell, (9th Cir. Dec. 5, 2019) (No. 19-30115)
[hereinafter Appellant’s Opening Brief].
6
Id. at *7; see generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(6)(a) (marijuana-infused products contain
marijuana and are intended for use by a registered card holder by means other than smoking).
1
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property it operated on.7 Campbell entered a plea agreement regarding his
first two counts, Conspiracy to Manufacture and Distribute Controlled
Substances,8 and Possession with Intent to Distribute Marijuana.9 The
third count, Maintaining Drug Involved Premises, is at issue on this
appeal.10
Campbell moved the United States District Court for the District
of Montana to dismiss the remaining count after presenting evidence at a
“McIntosh Hearing.”11 Typically, in adherence with the Supremacy
Clause, federal law takes precedence over interfering or contradicting state
laws.12 However, the Ninth Circuit in McIntosh carved out an exception to
this principle when it clarified the reach of a rider known as the
“Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment.”13 This rider, attached to an omnibus
spending bill, halted the DOJ’s use of federal funds to prosecute
individuals who violate the Controlled Substance Act while acting in
compliance with their state’s medical marijuana laws.14 The McIntosh
court held that defendants are entitled to an evidentiary hearing to
determine if they acted in compliance with state law.15 The defendant must
strictly comply with state law to enjoin the DOJ’s prosecution.16 The
United States bears the initial burden to establish that the defendant failed
to sufficiently comply with state law.17
The United States argued that Campbell did not act in strict
compliance with the MMA because he: (1) distributed marijuana in greater
amounts than those condoned by the MMA; (2) distributed marijuana
across state borders; (3) imported hash oil; and (4) manufactured and
distributed hash oil.18 Though the Appellee raised four arguments, the
District Court considered the last, manufacturing and distributing hash oil,
7

Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *3.
See generally 21 U.S.C.A. § 846 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158); Campbell, 2018 WL
6728062 at *4 (out of state possession is not in accordance with the MMA).
9
See generally 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-158); 18 U.S.C. § 2;
Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *4 (out of state possession is not in accordance with the MMA).
10
21 U.S.C.A. § 856(a)(1) (Campbell was indicted for owning property used to manufacture
“hashish” and “hash oil”).
11
United States v. McIntosh, 833 F.3d 1163, 1176–77 (9th Cir. 2016) (established the right for
defendants prosecuted in violation of federal controlled substance laws to demonstrate a strict
compliance with state marijuana laws. If strict compliance is shown, it enjoins the expenditure of
federal funds to prosecute these defendants).
12
See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
13
Consolidated and Further Continuing Appropriations Act, H.R. 83, 113th Cong. § 538 (2014).
14
Id.
15
McIntosh, 833 F.3d at 1179 (this has become known as a “McIntosh Hearing”).
16
Id.
17
United States v. Campbell, No. CR 18-5-BU-DLC, 2018 WL 6728062, at *3 (D. Mont. Dec. 21,
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-30115 (Jun. 6, 2019). The District of Montana found the government
bears the initial burden to establish a preponderance of evidence. If proved, the burden shifts to the
defendant. The Ninth Circuit has not provided further direction on who initially bears the evidentiary
burden.
18
Answering Brief of the United States at *12, United States v. Campbell, (9th Cir. Mar. 9, 2020)
(No. 19-30115) [hereinafter Answering Brief].
8
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dispositive.19 Relying on Montana v. Pirello,20 the District Court found
“nothing in the MMA or the administrative rules in existence during the
period covered by the indictment provided that hashish or hash oil is a
substance subject to the MMA.”21 The District Court found that once
reduced to concentrate, marijuana was not an “intact plant material” and
could not be considered marijuana per the MMA.22 The District Court
came to this conclusion reliant on Pirello’s differentiation between the
concentrate “hashish” and “usable marijuna.”23 This was the only issue
analyzed by the District Court. Campbell now appeals this decision and is
requesting the Ninth Circuit find that cannabis concentrates are included
within the MMA’s legal definition of marijuana.24
III.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS

Both parties’ arguments center on what the legal definition of
marijuana encompasses. Specifically, whether cannabis concentrates are
considered marijuana by the MMA.
The Appellant, Campbell, claims the District Court erred by
denying his motion to dismiss under McIntosh.25 The District Court
interpreted marijuana-infused products to mean products made with
“usable” or “intact” marijuana.26 This decision left mechanically
processed or extracted materials and concentrates outside of the definition
of marijuana, and therefore, outside the protections of the MMA and the
Rohrabacher-Farr Amendment.27 Campbell argues that the MMA should
be read to include cannabis concentrates under the definition of
marijuana.28 If the statutes cannot be reconciled to complement this
understanding, Campbell argues the Court should resolve the ambiguities
of the statutes by invoking the rule of lenity.29 Finally, Campbell contends
the Court should retroactively apply amendments made to the MMA in
2017, that clarify the use of cannabis concentrates in marijuana-infused
products is included under the statute, to his appeal.30
The Appellee, the United States, counters by claiming the District
Court correctly denied Campbell’s motion to dismiss because the cannabis
concentrates hashish and hash oil do not fall under the MMA’s definition
19

Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *4.
282 P.3d 662, 664–65 (Mont. 2012) (holding that hashish was not a “usable” form of marijuana).
21
Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *4.
22
Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *17 (citing Pirello, 282 P.3d at 664–65 (discussing the definition
of “hashish” under the 2009 MMA)).
23
Id. at *16.
24
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *9.
25
Id. at *10.
26
Id. at *12; Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *14.
27
Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062 at *5.
28
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *14.
29
Id. at *22. The rule of lenity requires the court to apply an ambiguous criminal statute in favor of
the defendant.
30
Id. at *25.
20
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of marijuana.31 The Appellee argues that cannabis concentrates derived
from a marijuana plant cannot classify as marijuana under the MMA
because they are not dried plant materials.32 It further claims there was not
a grievous ambiguity in the MMA to justify the use of the rule of lenity,
and that the 2017 modifications to the MMA substantially changed the
MMA instead of clarifying it; therefore the new version of the MMA
should not retroactively apply.33
A.

Appellant’s Argument

Campbell primarily argues that the District Court wrongfully
denied his motion to dismiss after his McIntosh Hearing. He claims the
District Court incorrectly interpreted the MMA when it excluded cannabis
concentrates from the legal definition of marijuana.34 Subsequently,
Campbell asserts the United States failed to establish, by a perponderance
of the evidence, that Campbell was guilty since Montana Bud had a license
to produce marijuana-infused products.35 Marijuana-infused refers to a
product “that contains marijuana and is intended for use . . . by a means
other than smoking” and includes “edible products, ointments, and
tinctures.”36 The 2015 MMA authorizes a provider to “manufacture and
provide marijuana-infused products.”37 Campbell argues “manufacture” in
this sense includes extracting concentrates obtained from marijuana
plants.38
For several reasons Campbell disputes the District Court’s
conclusion that marijuana reduced to concentrate is no longer marijuana
under the MMA. First, the District Court incorrectly relied on“usable
marijuana” because this term applies only to the quantity of dried
marijuana material a registered patient or provider may possess at one
time, not other types or forms of marijuana a provider may manufacture.39
Next, Campbell argues Pirello has no place in this analysis because
marijuana-infused products must contain “marijuana” not “usable
marijuana.”40 Campbell asserts it is unrealistic to create a marijuanainfused product in accordance with the District Court’s limitation of
31

Answering Brief, supra note 18, at *20.
Id. at *29–30.
Id. at *31–33.
34
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *21.
35
Id. at *14–15; see generally United States v. Campbell, No. CR 18-5-BU-DLC, 2018 WL
6728062, at *3 (D. Mont. Dec. 21, 2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-30115 (Jun. 6, 2019) (stating that
the prosecution bears the initial burden of evidence).
36
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(6)(a) (2015).
37
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(13) (2015).
38
Appellant’s Reply Brief at *2, United States v. Campbell, (9th Cir. Apr. 29, 2020) (No. 19-30115)
[hereinafter Appellant’s Reply Brief]; Appellant’s Opening Brief at *14.
39
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *25.
40
Id. at *16; see generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(6)(a), (20) (2015) (defining “usable
marijuana” as the dried leaves and flowers of the marijuana plant and any mixtures or preparations
of the dried leaves and flowers); contra Montana v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 664–65 (Mont. 2012)
(holding only “usable marijuana” was protected by the MMA).
32
33
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“usable marijuana.”41 To give products such as ointments and edibles their
medicinal properties it is necessary to extract THC, the healing factor,
from marijuana plants. By using cannabis concentrate, the infused
products can boast a consistent dose.42 He points out the inefficiency of
only allowing consumption of medical marijuana in dried form and asserts
that the District Court’s interpretation contradicts the MMA’s allowance
of medicinal products.43 He further claims that though the Montana
Controlled Substance Act (“MCSA”) defines the concentrate hashish
separately from marijuana, this distinction does not support the District
Court’s decision.44 He argues that pursuant to the MCSA, hashish, as all
other controlled substances, is considered illegal “except as provided in
Title 50, Chapter 46” of the Montana Code Annotated.45 Campbell asserts
since marijuana means “all plant material from the genus Cannabis
containing tetrahydrocannabinol (“THC”)”46 and because hashish is
derived from “marijuana plant materials” the concentrate was intended to
classify as marijuana and does not necessitate a separate definition in the
MMA.47
If the Ninth Circuit rejects Campbell’s argument that hashish and
other cannabis concentrates are marijuana under the MMA, he argues the
rule of lenity should apply to his case.48 This rule favors a defendant when
a criminal statute is found to be ambiguous.49 Campbell argues since the
MMA allows for the sale of edible medical marijuana and other marijuanainfused products,50 but fails to provide appropriate direction on how to
create these medicinal products, he understandably assumed he could
extract concentrate from marijuana plants to infuse his products with
consistent, accurate measures of THC.51
Campbell’s final argument claims that the 2017 Montana
Legislature clarified the presumed ambiguity surrounding this issue, and
therefore it should apply retroactively to his appeal.52 He argues the 2017
version did not add to the 2015 MMA; instead it made clear that the
process Montana Bud used to extract cannabis concentrate was always
allowed.53 He contends that because hashish is a concentrate derived from
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *23.
Id.
43
Id.
44
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 36, at *1; see generally MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(15).
45
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-102(1) (2015).
46
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(18) (2015).
47
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 38, at *1–4.
48
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *22.
49
See generally United States v. Wyatt, 408 F.3d 1257, 1262 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding “when a
criminal statute is ambiguous” it favors the defendant).
50
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(13) (2015).
51
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *22.
52
Id. at *25
53
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 38, at *3.
41
42

2020

PREVIEW: UNITED STATES V. CAMPBELL

19

the marijuana plant, though the 2015 MMA lacked the clarifying language
of the 2017 MMA, the intent for the concentrates to be regulated by the
MMA did not change.54
B.

Appellee’s Argument

The United States responds to Campbell’s claim that it failed to
surmount its burden of evidence at the McIntosh Hearing by pointing to
two presumed deficiencies in his argument.55 It first highlights an
interpretation of United States v. Evans that would relieve the government
of the initial burden of proof.56 Second, if it was required to initially prove
a lack of strict compliance by Campbell, it met its burden.57 The United
States claims that it did demonstrate that Montana Bud and Campbell
manufactured and distributed hash oil, which it claims is not marijuana
defined by the MMA, and thus outside the protections of the RohrabacherFarr Amendment.58 It relies heavily on Pirello, and assert that none of the
terms “marijuana, marijuana-infused product, or usable marijuana”
include hashish or hash oil in their definitions–therefore cannabis
concentrates cannot be considered marijuana.59 The Appellee claims that
the Montana Legislature intentionally chose not to define a marijuanainfused product as containing a cannabis concentrate, and that this choice
demonstrates the MMA does not condone a provider’s manufacture of
cannabis concentrates.60 It attacks Campbell’s efficiency argument by
claiming nothing stops patients and providers from only using dried
marijuana in marijuana-infused products.61
The Appellee argues that the District Court correctly ruled that the
MMA lacked an ambiguity so uncertain that the rule of lenity must be
applied in Campbell’s favor.62 The government denies Campbell’s
complaint that the MMA provides for the sale of infused products without
providing a clear understanding of how to legally infuse those products
consistently.63 Instead, Appellee asserts that hashish and other cannabis
concentrates clearly fall outside the plain language parameters of the
MMA; thus there cannot be a grievous ambiguity in the language of the
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(10) (2017) (Marijuana concentrate is “any type of marijuana
product consisting wholly or in part of the resin extracted from any part of the marijuana plant);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(15) (2015) (“Hashish . . . is composed of resin from the cannabis
plant”).
55
Answering Brief, supra note 18, at *24.
56
929 F.3d 1073, 1076–77 (9th Cir. 2019) (required the defendant to first prove compliance with
state law).
57
Answering Brief, supra note 18, at *25.
58
Id.
59
Id. at *26.
60
Id. at *27.
61
Id. at *29.
62
Id. at *31.
63
Id.
54
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statute to provide Campbell relief.64 They firmly differentiate between
marijuana and cannabis concentrates, claiming that because the MCSA
differentiates concentrates as “highly-condensed psychoactive resin” they
cannot also classify as marijuana.65
Finally, the Appellee denies that the 2017 modifications to the
MMA were mere clarifications of the role of concentrates within the
MMA.66 They assert the changes in 2017 added to the scope of the MMA,
and as such cannot be applied retroactively.67 For current law to be applied
to preceding criminal charges, there must be a clear intent by the
legislature to allow for such action.68 The United States argues that no
clear intent exists within the 2017 MMA.69
IV.

ANALYSIS

The deciding issue, whether cannabis concentrates fit the
definition of marijuana under the MMA will be considered de novo.70
Regardless of which side the Ninth Circuit comes down on, this case will
have lasting implications that affect both qualifying patients and medical
marijuana providers in Montana as they interpret present and future
modifications to the MMA.
Neither the arguments concerning the rule lenity or applicability
of the 2017 MMA will contribute much to this decision. Both will likely
fall, by default, in line with the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of the main
issue. Because Montana’s medical marijuana laws have historically
changed from legislative session to session, Campbell’s argument that the
ambiguity of the statute should favor his position at first seems like a valid
approach. In 2004, Montana enacted the MMA and the original version
remained lenient until 2011, when stricter legislation took its place.71
Again in 2015, the MMA saw changes.72 The 2015 version of the statute
is at issue here. The clash of understanding by Campbell and the United
States in and of itself demonstrates an ambiguity in the MMA. However,
64

Id. at *32 (citing United States v. Phillips, 376 F.3d 846, 857, n. 39 (9th Cir. 2004) (The ambiguity
must be “grievous” in nature to favor the defendant under this rule.).
65
Id. at *33.
66
Id.
67
Id.
68
See generally Valles v. Ivy Hill Corp., 410 F.3d 1071, 1079 (9th Cir. 2005).
69
Answering Brief, supra note 18, at *35.
70
See generally Garmon v. County of Los Angeles, 828 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2016) (Where issues
of statutory interpretation are considered by appellate courts as if for the first time.).
71
Montana Cannabis Indus. Ass’n v. State, 286 P.3d 1161, 1163 (Mont. 2012); see generally
Thomas J. Bourguignon, Montana Cannabis Industry Association v. State of Montana and the
Constitutionality of Medical Marijuana, 75 MONT. L. REV. 167, 171–72 (2014) (The 2004 act
allowed qualifying patients access to medical marijuana, it did not restrict the number of patients a
caregiver could assist, in 2011 the act became more restrictive, and required “objective proof” to
become a registered cardholder; it also limited providers to three qualifying patients).
72
See generally MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 50-46-301 through 344 (2015).
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Campbell raises the rule of lenity as a tiebreaker, not a primary issue;
consequently, the Ninth Circuit will likely find it does not support his
argument.73 If the Ninth Circuit agrees with his primary argument, that
cannabis concentrates are marijuana, the rule of lenity proves unnecessary.
However, if the Court does find that the MMA did not cover concentrates,
it will likely reach this conclusion because it considers the 2015 MMA
clear enough in its definitions to support the District Court’s conclusion
that there was no grievous ambiguity in the statute’s writing.74
Campbell’s request for the 2017 MMA to retroactively apply
suffers a similar redundancy. He argues that the 2017 MMA clarified that
his actions were legal under the 2015 MMA.75 If the Ninth Circuit concurs,
application of the 2017 MMA is unnecessary because the 2015 MMA will
sufficiently protect him.76 However, if the Ninth Circuit instead finds that
cannabis concentrates are not defined as marijuana under the 2015 MMA,
it will likely not agree with Campbell’s claim that the 2017 MMA
clarified, rather than added to the understanding of concentrates per
marijuana-infused products.77
The crux of this case is whether cannabis concentrates constitute
marijuana as defined by the MMA. For Campbell to prevail on this issue,
his argument will have to overcome the District Court’s outdated
precedent.78 In 2012, Buddy Pirello argued his criminal charges for
possession should be dropped because he possessed the concentrate
hashish in accordance with the MMA’s limitations of “usable
marijuana.”79 The Court found that hashish did not meet the criteria of
usable marijuana because the MMA defined it as “the dried leaves and
flowers of marijuana and any mixture or preparation of marijuana.”80 The
Court found because the plant material used to make hashish was reduced
to resin, it not only no longer qualified as usable marijuana, it also failed
to fit the general definition of marijuana under the MMA.81 Therefore, it
did not classify as a medical marijuana exemption of the Controlled
Substances Act.82 Whether Pirello correctly interpreted concentrate as
separate from the definition of usable marijuana does not apply to
73

United States v. Campbell, No. CR 18-5-BU-DLC, 2018 WL 6728062, at *17 (D. Mont. Dec. 21,
2018), appeal docketed, No. 19-30115 (Jun. 6, 2019).
74
Id.; see generally United States v. Phillips, 376 F.3d 846, 857, n. 39 (9th Cir. 2004) (the ambiguity
in the statute must be grievous to favor the defendant); Montana v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 664–65
(Mont. 2012) (the Court would likely use this precedent to reach a conclusion the statue was
sufficiently clear).
75
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 5, at *25.
76
Id.
77
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 38, at *3–4.
78
Campbell, 2018 WL 6728062at *14; see generally Pirello, 282 P.3d at 662.
79
Pirello, 282 P.3d at 664–65.
80
Id.
81
Id.
82
Id. at 665; see generally 21 U.S.C. chp. 13 (chapter on controlled substances).
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Campbell’s issue. The issue is if cannabis concentrates fit within the
general defintion of marijuana, not the usable marijuana definition.
Current courts and legislature are trending towards defining cannabis
concentrates as marijuana for purpose of state medical marijuana laws.83
Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit will likely find that the District
Court incorrectly relied on Pirello; both because the present case addresses
a different issue, and Pirello has become outdated. Campbell never argued
that cannabis concentrates are usable marijuana; he claims that
concentrates fit the general definition of marijuana, and thus are an
accepted component of a marijuana-infused products.84 Usable marijuana
references the amount of dried plant material a person can possess.85
Though Pirello does offer a Montana based precedent, the Ninth Circuit
will likely instead apply a different, more fitting analysis that recently
arose from Arizona in Arizona v. Jones.86 Due to the factual similarities of
this present case and Jones, and that of Montana and Arizona’s marijuana
laws, it is likely the Ninth Circuit will follow the Arizona Supreme Court’s
analysis and find that cannabis concentrates are marijuana for the purposes
of the MMA.87
In Jones, the Arizona Supreme Court considered the plain
language of that state’s statute, and found that cannabis concentrates are
marijuana for the purposes of the Arizona Medical Marijuana Act
(“AMMA”).88 The Court closely examined the definition of marijuana,
defined in the AMMA, as “all parts of the plant” and held that the plain
meaning of “all” and “parts” extended to cannabis extracts and
concentrates as they originate from parts of the marijuana plant.89 The
Court also interpreted “manufacture” to mean making a “product suitable
for use,” especially when creating a marijuana product not intended to be
smoked.90After taking into consideration medical use and methods of
consumption, the Court concluded that, though cannabis concentrates are
not expressly stated in the AMMA’s definition of marijuana, the
surrounding statutes implied that the extension of state medical marijuana
laws encompassed cannabis concentrates.91 Montana and Arizona have
83

E.g., MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-46-302(10) (2017) (marijuana concentrate means any marijuana
product consisting of extracted plant material); See also Arizona v. Jones, 440 P.3d 1139 (Ariz.
2019) (Arizona’s medical marijuana act defines marijuana as including cannabis concentrates);
People v. Mulcrevy, 182 Cal. Rptr. 3d 176 (Cal. App. 3d dist. 2014) (finding concentrates are
protected by the Compassionate Use Act).
84
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 38, at *1–2.
85
Id.
86
See generally Jones, 440 P.3d at 1139.
87
Id. at 1144.
88
Id. at 1142.
89
Jones, 440 P.3d at 1142; compare MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(18) (2015) (the Montana
definition also includes “all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis”).
90
Jones, 440 P.3d at 1142.
91
Id.; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-2801(1), (8), (15).
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very similar statutory definitions of marijuana.92 Since the states share
such close language, it is likely the Ninth Circuit comes to the same
conclusion regarding the MMA that the Arizona Supreme Court came to
regarding the AMMA.
The Court in Jones referenced Pirello, and distinguished the
Montana Court’s analysis from their own because Pirello “crossreferences and incorporates the criminal code distinction between
marijuana and hashish.”93 However, the Ninth Circuit will likely consider
this distinction a fault to the application of Pirello to the present case, not
a difference between the Montana and Arizona statutes. This is likely
because Pirello identifies the distinction between hashish and “usable
marijuana” under the 2009 MMA, not how the 2015 MMA might allow
for the use and manufacture of cannabis concentrates under the general
definition of marijuana.94 The Ninth Circuit will likely focus on the
Arizona Supreme Court’s analysis that because “resin must first be
extracted from the plant” it “reflects that it is part of the plant.”95 This
conclusion supports that the cannabis concentrate hashish, made from
resin, fits the MMA’s definition of marijuana.96
V.

CONCLUSION

This Ninth Circuit decision will determine the legal definition of
marijuana in Montana for the purposes of the MMA. If the Ninth Circuit
affirms the District Court’s decision, it will restrict medical marijuana to
the exclusive use of dried products, effectively banning cannabis
concentrates and extracts. This extends to edibles and ointments that use
cannabis concentrates to ensure a consistent measure of THC; these
products could remain illegal under the separate definition of hashish
found in the MCSA. Failure to reverse the District Court’s decision could
severely limit qualifying patients’ use of medical marijuana.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(18) (2015) (“marijuana means all plant material from the genus
cannabis containing tetrahydrocannabinol); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2801(10) (“marijuana
means all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis”).
93
Id.
94
Montana v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662, 664–65.
95
Jones, 440 P.3d at 1142; see generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2801(10) (“marijuana means
all parts of any plant of the genus cannabis”).
96
MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-32-101(18) (2015) (“marijuana means all plant material from the genus
cannabis containing tetrahydrocannabinol); see Jones, 440 P.3d at 1142 (“Taken together, ‘all parts’
refers to all constituent elements of the marijuana plant, and the fact the resin must first be extracted
from the plant reflects that it is part of the plant”).
92

